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**PROFESSOR CALDWELL'S ADDRESS.**

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AN  
ADDRESS,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE

TRUSTEES AND STUDENTS,

AT THE

*Pea Body Institute*

ANNUAL COMMENCEMENT

OF

DICKINSON COLLEGE,

CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA,

JULY 16, 1835.

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BY MERRITT CALDWELL, A. M.

PROFESSOR OF THE EXACT SCIENCES.

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*at hand 100*

In Exchange  
Peabody Inst. of Balto.  
June 16 1927

With the respects of  
L. J. F. Deems and a  
desires that his cousin  
will read the following  
ADDRESS.

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THE cause of education, for its prosperity, depends on the interest taken in it by its friends; and when it is thought how much all are indebted to it, it might at first seem strange, that it should ever want the encouragement which it is in their power to give. But when we look out upon the jarring interests of community, — the noise and strife which pervade the business world; — when we see the rush there is to improvement, to discovery, to invention, to everything indeed that can interest the feelings, promote pecuniary advantage, or add to the pleasures of sense, we find a satisfactory solution of the fact. Indeed we see even the devotees of learning in danger of being turned aside by these counter influences; and any of those who are called to mingle in these commotions, and to listen to the world's discordant harmony, may well consider themselves fortunate, if they have never felt the paralyzing influence of these things on their love of letters.

It is then good for us to be here, — good for us thus to turn aside to commune with the days of our youth, and to shake hands with those associations which the memory of the past will always hold dear. Were it not for occasions like the present, we might forget the interest we have in the cause of learning, and devote ourselves exclusively to the world. But the recurrence of these reminds us of our obligations, calls us back to our duty, and makes us feel, that we have an alliance with society more strong than the feeble tenure by which we hold our lives, and that our influence may be felt in the generations that are to come after us. Associating, as I do, such ideas with the occasion that has called us together, I should consider it little less than sacrilege to attempt to amuse my au-



dience with the figures of rhetoric, or to while away the hour in idle speculations or visionary theories. I have assumed to myself the graver task of pointing out some of the *Practical Errors connected with Intellectual Education*. And here I will premise, that I shall consider education, not as confined to the learning derived from books, or that communicated by set lessons of instruction; but as embracing all the means by which the mind is improved, its susceptibilities developed, or its views expanded; and extending consequently from the early lessons gathered from parental precept and example, up to that mental discipline, which is implied in the term *self-education*.

With this explanation, the first error to which I shall call your attention, is that which leads the scholar to too sudden a rush from *truth* to *causes*. It often happens, that truth is not remarkably difficult to be substantiated. Observation, even though careless, teaches us a thousand truths, — a thousand facts, which are fully established without any reference to their causes. And by consciousness, we become acquainted with another class of truths, connected with our mental operations. Well established truths, then, of various kinds, may exist, without ever leading the mind to the contemplation of their cause. Thus, for example, the savage knows well, that his arrow when hurled will return to the ground, though he may never have thought of the cause that draws it downward; and the most unthinking rustic, too, is fully aware, that those things which interest his feelings most deeply are the things to which the memory adheres the most readily and the most strongly, without even thinking whether there *be* any cause for this, or not.

But the intellect of man is an inquisitive principle. Truth will not long be before the intelligent mind, without leading to an inquiry for the cause; nor is the mind patient of long delay in its researches. Hence the importance of caution and watchful care. For want of these, facts are often attempted to be accounted for on wrong principles, and false causes are assigned. This has come in as a fruitful source of error in every department of science; and giant minds have been compelled to waste their strength in combating and doing away errors which have

had such an origin. Even the leading truths connected with the philosophy of the mind, have but recently been traced to their true causes; and many are the phenomena, witnessed both in the intellectual and natural, as well as in the moral world, the causes of which are still left for true philosophy to discover, notwithstanding the many hasty solutions already given.

Not only are causes radically wrong often assigned to explain known truths; but general laws, — which if deserving the name of causes at all, are only nominal, — have often been assigned as the satisfactory causes of the things to be explained. Gravity, electricity, magnetism, vitality, vegetation, etc., when referred to as ultimate causes of natural phenomena, are of this description. The mere pretender to learning is full of this kind of causes; and the boasting pedant is the last one to say in relation to anything, however abstruse, that he does not know the cause. How different this from the spirit of true philosophy! Hear the concession of Mr. Locke, that Hercules in mental science, — a concession which the half-educated would think too humiliating for himself to make. “He that knows anything,” says he, “knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way, have dark sides that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of matter.”

A leading cause of the error to which we have referred is found in that mental indolence, that refuses to search for remote causes, — that refuses to go back behind the scene, and to contemplate the hidden wires which in truth move the whole apparatus, but which are concealed by the curtain which intervenes. It is not then an error of reason, but of indolence. It however puts into the hand of the designing a most dangerous weapon, and one which he too often uses, to ruin the unwary and the young. Few mature intellects have ever been themselves deceived by this kind of sophistry; but many, how many! have had to employ their powers in counteracting the influence of early prejudices which have had such an origin; and

to exercise the philosophy peculiar to gifted souls, in rejecting and dashing from them errors which have come up from childhood with them, growing with their growth and strengthening with their strength.

To him, who in the pursuit of truth would be able clearly to trace facts to their true causes ; and thus avoid the errors which are everywhere found among the ignorant and the superficial, extensive knowledge is absolutely necessary. Nothing can supply the place of this. But in addition, the power of patient investigation, and an honest love of the truth are needed. The fact that men of profound learning and extensive knowledge have long continued in error, abundantly proves that candor and patience are not less necessary to lead us into truth, than knowledge itself.

Another power, to him who would be able to trace back facts to their true causes, is exceedingly important ; and that is, the power to suspend judgment. To this we are peculiarly reluctant. Not only is there a feeling of impatience in the mind which prevents it, and a degree of mental indolence which it is not easy to overcome ; but with most mere superficial scholars there is a pride in exhibiting a readiness on all important questions, which prevents them from the exercise of careful inquiry, till they have committed themselves ; and till they are thus disqualified to make truth the object of their research. Bacon, and Euler, and Locke, and Newton, and Reid, and Franklin, had the power of predicating their judgments on full and mature reflection. Nor will he who would cultivate a philosophic mind, deviate much from the course they have marked out for him. The truth is, we often have to acknowledge our ignorance. The causes of a thousand things are designedly hid from us, and of a thousand others are so remote, as to require time and care to search them out.

Another popular error connected with education, is that useful learning can be acquired without intellectual effort. This error is not often expressed in words, though in practice it has prevailed to a fearful extent. It is the counterpart of that



which would deprive the student of the necessary aids to improvement, that the whole might be the result of his unaided effort. Each of these systems has had its turn. While the latter only delayed the student in his progress, and threw unnecessary discouragements in his way ; the former has had a much more pernicious influence in lowering the standard of education, debilitating the mind, and thus disqualifying the individual for the more responsible and arduous duties of life. This principle has found its way into every department of learning from the infant school to the university, — from the A B C to the learned profession.

For instance, go into the infant schools of our cities, and hear children, almost as soon as they can speak at all, taught to talk about rectangles, prisms and parallelograms, or about meridians and ecliptics ; or hear them chant the tables of arithmetic, or repeat the unintelligible dogmas of the catechism ; as though the sublime truths of geometry, astronomy and theology, could be embraced by the infant mind, and mathematics and religion consisted in names alone. Sure one would think this must be the “royal road to learning.” — Again, go into the primary schools of our country, and see there the rising youth conning the lessons of their grammars, or spelling-book ; or endeavoring to *cipher through their Arithmetics*, by learning the rules and getting the answers to the sums. Here the process is as mechanical, as are the motions of the automaton ; nor does it differ from them more in any other particular, than in the want of correctness in its results. Instances of the same error are to be seen in those who would learn the application of mathematical principles, without first attending to the elements ; or who would become proficient in the natural sciences, without going abroad to look at nature as she is. — The error thus far seems to consist in not accurately distinguishing between names and ideas, and in substituting the exercise of memory for judgment and reason ; and the blame in these cases attaches principally to teachers, who should never permit a pupil to enter upon or prosecute the investigation of any subject, which he is not fully prepared to understand.

A similar effect is produced on the minds of most of their students, by those institutions, which render effort unnecessary for obtaining their highest honors. And in this respect, no system is perhaps so faulty, as that of communicating instruction by lectures. This does well in Lyceums, and on other occasions where the object is to illustrate by experiment, or to communicate general instruction on popular subjects; but to give it the place it has in at least one class of institutions in our country, is but to substitute the interesting for the useful, and to open another "royal road to learning." Even the profound mysteries of the law, which can be illustrated neither by diagrams nor skeletons, are taught by lectures, and this method of instruction is introduced into many other schools. Judging from the immediate results, we might suppose some magical influence attached to this system; for the process of making what they call educated or professional men goes on in these schools, with as much regularity at least, as any mechanical process; and the regular graduation and bestowment of honors is much more uniform, than where personal effort is called into requisition, and personal excellence made the rigid test of success.

One hour of close application to the pages of Homer, or to the demonstrations of Euclid, is preferable to a dozen lectures; and a thorough recitation to one deeply read in law or medicine, and well versed in its practice, will give more practical instruction to a student in these departments, than any lecture which can be delivered. — Godman, whom, though a distinguished anatomist, no profession can claim, but whose name remains as a legacy to the nation, and to the world, was not made in the lecture room.

He built his own stature, made himself.

He has himself given us his early history, in a letter to a friend. — "Before I was two years old, says he, I was motherless; — before I was five years old I was fatherless and friendless. I have been deprived of property by fraud, that was mine by right. I have eaten the bread of misery, I have drunk the cup of sorrow. — I have passed the flower of my days in a state little better than slavery, and arrived at what? Manhood, pov-

erty and desolation.”\* Such does he represent himself, when he commenced the study of medicine; and it is interesting to inquire, how he acquired, in his short life, the envied eminence to which he attained.

One who knew him well, says, — “His eagerness in the pursuit of knowledge seemed like the impulse of gnawing hunger, and an unquenchable thirst, which neither disease nor adversity could allay.” “His ambition and thirst for knowledge,” says another, “were such, that having commenced an investigation, or a language, no difficulty could stop him; and what he had no time to accomplish in the day, he would do at night, instead of enjoying that rest of which he often stood in so much need.”† It was thus by intense application and untiring industry, that he made himself what he was; and his biography speaks volumes in favor of the omnipotence of these. No error can be more fatal, than that learning can be acquired without them; unless it be that other error, which is nearly allied to it, that learning when acquired must be associated with ease and luxury. Let him, who in the pursuit of science would get along without toil and effort, or him who having received the honors of an institution would contemplate his education as finished, and settle down in the enjoyment of ease and luxury, think of Godman; and let such think, that the price he paid for his undying fame is that toil they affect to despise. And let them also remember one other fact, — that amidst all his multiplied pursuits, he found time to commence and carry through the most thorough investigation of the truth of the christian revelation, and in his later years to attend to the duties and cultivate the virtues connected with the religion of Christ. Yes, Godman was a christian.

The error of which we have spoken, often seems to have its origin in an excessive feeling of haste, on the part of the learner, to complete his education. All the means that can be devised to facilitate the onward course are brought into requisition; and as far as possible the pleasing is substituted for the

\* Quoted from the N. A. Review, for Jan. 1835. Art. Memoir of Dr. Godman.

† These extracts are quoted from Dr. Thomas Sewall's eulogy on Dr. Godman.



useful, and the showy for the more solid. Nor does the feeling of the young girl, who is eager for her *three months* at a boarding school to close, that she may return home to be looked upon as a *lady*, differ from the feelings of the more advanced scholar, who eagerly looks forward to the time when *his education shall be finished*, and he shall go out into the world a *learned man*. This feeling of haste is encouraged by the book-making community; and to such an extent have mechanical facilities been introduced into our systems of education, that we can with no small degree of propriety speak of the mechanical character of this our boasted age. And to such self-styled improvements, the ignorance or the indifference of our teachers but too often gives a ready introduction; and thus our schools and institutions of learning are becoming flooded with but poor substitutes for industry and common sense.

The practice of reading without reflection may well be introduced under this head. "Nothing," says an extensive and accomplished writer,\* "has such a tendency to weaken, not only the powers of invention, but the intellectual powers in general, as this." Yet by how many is it practiced. Forgetful of our maxim, that nothing valuable can be acquired without great effort, how many amuse themselves with the idea, that the time thus spent is usefully employed, at the same time that they read merely from indolence. Others read from a curiosity to learn what an author says, without once inquiring whether what he says be true. By such reading nothing but the memory is called into exercise; the higher faculties of the mind fall into disuse, at the same time that the mind itself becomes unsettled in relation to every important sentiment or opinion. There are others still, who read in the same way, not so much from any personal curiosity, as for the want of moral courage. For, as has been well said, "It requires courage indeed to remain ignorant of those useless subjects, which are generally valued."† How necessary, however, such a courage is, to him who either loves the truth, or is in pursuit of an enduring fame, I need not say.

\* Stewart.

† Helvetius.



Another popular error is, that all education should have for its basis practical utility ; by which is meant, that all the pursuits of the scholar should have a direct reference to this principle. Bringing the various objects of pursuit which call the attention of the scholar to this test, some reject from a course of study one thing and some another. And to such an extent has the principle been pushed, that scarcely a branch of learning remains, whether connected with science or literature, which has not been assailed by it. Some utterly reject all knowledge of the mathematics, except what is necessary to present those truths, which are of actual service in the practical business of life ; and even these truths may be learned, say they, without attending to the tedious demonstrations by which they are established. Thus the study of the exact sciences, is reduced to the simple process of committing to memory a few propositions which are susceptible of an application to the common concerns of life.

All the objections which are raised against the study of the sciences on the ground of practical inutility are based on an entire forgetfulness of one of the leading objects of education, — that is *mental discipline*. This, with the acquisition of useful knowledge, constitutes the education ; and of the two must be considered far the most important. For with a mind well disciplined, — a mind trained to close and accurate thought, practical knowledge to any extent may be readily acquired ; but without this previous discipline, even knowledge itself, if possessed, would be of little avail. But no truth can be considered better established, than that application constitutes the only effectual discipline of the mind. For the purpose of mental discipline, then, if for no other, the foundations of science should be laid permanent and deep in the human mind.

Objections which rest on the same general principle are brought against the pursuit of the natural sciences ; and we often hear the inquiry in relation to the collection of the botanist and the zoologist, as well as the cabinet of the mineralogist, — “ What are they all worth ? ” And the mere pretender to learning often joins in the laugh, when the unproductive fol-

ly of the naturalist is the topic of conversation. Is it indeed, then, in vain, that God has spread out his works before us? and is there no advantage derived from looking through nature up to nature's God? Suffice it to say, that God has implanted in the mind that becomes cultivated, a love for the study of his works; and has connected with this study a hidden charm, which he who feels, though he may pass a life of toil and go down to his grave in poverty, unhonored and unsung, envies not the idle man his ease, the miser his stores, or the statesman his honors.

For their supposed practical inutility, almost every branch of polite learning also has been rejected from the list of useful study. In relation to Language, History, Rhetoric and a few others, the question is settled; and few now think of objecting to them on this account. But Poetry and Music are of a more doubtful character. In relation to these, however, permit me to say, that they are the first lessons which man has ever learned from his Maker. Nature's children have always been poets, from the Hebrew of old, to the native inhabitant of your soil, — from the hyperborean snows of the Goths and Scythians, to the torrid zone, where wanders the African in his native glory. The praises of God have in all ages and in all climates gone up, associated with all that is inspiring in poetry and song; and many of the choicest portions of inspiration have been given in poetic numbers.

Painting and sculpture are but sister arts; and those only who have had the pleasure of looking on the masterpieces of the first artists, are prepared to judge with any degree of correctness on the subject. — If asked, in general terms, why I would have a taste for the fine arts cultivated, my answer should be, — because we are so constituted by our Creator that these become to us sources of happiness. And it yet remains to be proved, that the pleasure derived from this source is less pure, than that which the man of the world derives from his industry, his titles, or his gold.

An error, the opposite of that to which we have alluded, has an existence at least in practice; and the principle of utility

has been lost sight of in some of our systems of education. This also has been pushed to strange extremes. On the one hand, mental discipline, without any regard to its practical application, has been consulted; and on the other, all reference to this has been lost, and external accomplishments have received the whole attention. In regard to its former application, I may be permitted to add to what I have already said on the subject, that there should be a proper blending of mental discipline with the acquisition of useful knowledge. The amount of attention, therefore, given to the abstruse sciences, should depend on the extent to which the education is to be carried. Thus the study of the Calculus, or even of Geometry, would not be thought as important to him who is simply preparing himself for a farm, as would be that of chemical and mechanical Philosophy, and some of the other branches of natural science. In a limited course of study, then, the principal dependence for disciplining the mind, must be on the effort necessary to the acquisition of useful knowledge. In a full and complete course, however, the abstract sciences properly claim a high share of attention; nor should any one, who would acquire the power or habit of close consecutive thinking, think lightly of such a course.

In regard to the latter application of this erroneous principle, which attaches too much importance to mere external accomplishments, and in their glitter loses sight of the principle of utility, I may say, it has been principally confined to female education. Happily for the rising race however, there are becoming more and more Cornelias in our country, — more and more, who consider their children as their jewels; and who prefer, that their daughters should compare with the diamond of the mine, rather than with the lilly of the valley. But how many have we seen, — accomplished young ladies to be sure, — of whom it might be said, that a genteel form, a graceful movement, and a store of romantic lore, accompanied perchance with a smattering of music and French, constitute the whole of their education. Yet perhaps years had been given to its acquisition. The object of female education, in these cases seems to be lost sight of. The young lady is not always to remain



that fantastic being she is at sixteen. Her education should be such as to fit her for other scenes,—when she shall become, what indeed she should always be, the *companion* instead of the *idol* of her friends. In many cases education has accomplished this object; and not a few are found, who, when addressed as the mere creatures of feeling,—the proper subjects of flattery, and as unable to enjoy even an intellectual repast, know well how to appreciate *such* a complement to their intelligence.

Yet all is not as it should be. The standard of female education is not raised sufficiently high. How many there are yet, whose highest object is to acquire some of the more graceful accomplishments; and who value some trifling work of taste, or skill in the fine arts, higher than the literary gem, or a much more valuable treasure drawn from the mines of science. The object of a knowledge of the fine arts, or the lighter literature, is to add a polish to a more thorough intellectual education; and should be attended to, only to sweeten the toils connected with the acquisition of solid learning, or to give a healthful acuteness to the imagination and a perfection to the sentient powers, which the pursuit of the sciences had failed to yield. At the same time, then, that the principle of utility, as it has been defined, should not predominate, so as to swallow up everything else, neither should it be lost sight of, in any system of education, or department of learning.

Another grand practical error connected with education, very different in its nature from those I have noticed, arises from the supposition, that the mind is divided in its action into separate powers. Thus we often hear philosophy contrasted with feeling; and taste and imagination with judgment; and (to represent the subject more clearly) we have seen the will set in array with the passions, as if they sustained to each other only a relation like tribes or clans inhabiting the same district; and have had it presented to us, as *one power* of the mind engaged in a conflict with the *other powers*, and liable to have its acts even annulled by them. Thus the volitions are represented as the acts of but a *part* of the mind, instead of being, as they



are, the acts of the *whole* mind, in the exercise of that susceptibility, by which is exhibited the result of its own deliberations. Passing, however, this last erroneous application of the principle, which is here introduced only for illustration, — the powers or faculties of the mind are often spoken of, not only as distinct and capable of independent action ; but their acts are represented as incongruous the one with the other, so that the ability to perform one class of mental operations is made to preclude the power of performing others. This is the point we shall first examine. Here is opened a broad field of discussion ; and I have only to regret, that I must delay but a few moments, where I might linger an hour. — By way of introduction, let me inquire, where are found the power of philosophical research, and the deep-toned emotion, — the accurate taste, and the powerful judgment ? — where, but in the mind ? And what is the mind, but *one undivided intelligence* ? I think it not difficult to be made to appear, that every mental act, of whatever character, is an act of the *whole* mind. If so, however great be the difference in the strength of different minds, the inference is strong, that that mind which is powerful to feel, is powerful to reason ; and that the vigorous and well regulated imagination is never unassociated with the strong judgment.

In the examination of this subject however, we will be particular. In common parlance, as we have suggested, strong thought is supposed to be inconsistent with deep feeling ; and, on the contrary, a want of feeling is dignified by the name of philosophy. Judging from the frequency of such admissions, we might almost be led to consider it a moral axiom. It has been strongly expressed by one of our statesmen,\* where he says, “ A true philosopher is superior to humanity ; he could walk at ease over this earth, if it were unpeopled ; he could tread with all the pleasure of curiosity, on its cinders, the day after the final conflagration.” With this sentiment, the hypothesis I have just advanced is altogether at variance. I can indeed have an idea, that the conceit of the poet† might be realized ; — that the last of our race, wrapt about with the sub-

\* Ames' Essays — Equality, No. 1.

† Campbell.

limity of emotion, and lost in the consciousness of his own dignity and of his alliance with the Supreme, might tread on the fragments of the ruined world, and, as his eye caught the last lingering ray of the extinguished sun,

The dark'ning universe defy  
To quench his immortality,  
Or shake his trust in God.

But I cannot conceive, that it is the part of true philosophy to look upon human woe without emotion, to tread unmoved upon the ruins of time, or to gaze, as a disinterested spectator, upon the operation of anything which concerns the welfare of our race.

But; to take a philosophical view of this subject, what is feeling? — What, but an emotion arising from the perception of some object, or truth; and consequently, associated with some thought, or idea? If it be thus, then intense feeling, so far from being opposed to thinking, is but another name for intense thought; and that mind alone, is powerful to feel, which is powerful to think, — powerful to reason. And if it indeed be thus, it is interesting to inquire, how a sentiment the opposite of this came to be so generally diffused. The argument briefly stated, is this. — The philosopher, — he who really deserves the appellation, — is seen to pursue whatever he purposes in his heart, with an inflexibility and decision, which seem much more like the result of cool reason than of passion. Whatever conscience or reason dictates, he never shrinks from, whatever inducements indolence or passion suggest to turn him from his purpose. The warrior too, it is said, mingles in the strife of conflicting armies, issues his orders and sustains his broken troops, surrounded by the dead and the dying, with a coolness utterly incompatible with the exercise of the tender emotions. Again, we are referred to the orator, who with “quiet dignity and unruffled self-possession,” can sway at pleasure the feelings and judgment of his audience, bring into violent conflict all the excitable ingredients of human nature,

With terror now can pierce the cowering blood,  
And now dissolve the heart in tenderness;

and who, meantime, looks apparently unmoved,

On hearts and passions prostrate at his feet.

And the inference from these premises is, that these men do not feel as intensely, as do inferior minds.

This inference is erroneous. Matter of fact proves that these men have passions capable of being roused to tremendous action. They differ from other men simply in this, that their passions are under the control of their wills. The joyous *Eureka* of Archimides, the trembling frame of Newton, as he came near to the conclusion of those calculations, which gave laws to the universe, and the swooning of Rittenhouse, when his prediction was realized, and he was gazing at a phenomenon,\* which no eye should again see, till other generations should people the earth, — demonstrate, that these men could *feel* as well as *reason*. Washington, on parting with his compatriots at the close of the Revolution, gave silent, but affecting and impressive evidence, of the deepest emotion ; and Napoleon, — even Napoleon ! could be agitated to trembling, on hearing the piteous moans of a dog, that lay by the side of his master on the deserted battle-field. That orator, too, who stands in all the dignity of self-collection, — if it but subserve his purpose, can throw off the restraint from his passions ; when at once his voice, his action, the flashes of his eye, the vitality he gives to every expression of sentiment — all become indices of the raging of that tempest which has till then been confined within. It remains to be shown, that such feel less strongly, than did Homer, when he described the tears of Andromache ; or than Virgil, when he sung the fate of Nisus and Eurialus ; or that any of these did not feel more strongly, than *can* the common vulgar mind.

This error has led thousands to cultivate a stoical turn of mind, — an apathy and indifference to human weal and human woe, which has proved ruinous to the finer feelings of their nature, destroyed the delicate texture of the soul, cut them loose from the sympathies of life, and blighted those nice sensibilities, without which society is but a name, and intercourse with the world but loneliness and solitude. If the views I have advocated be correct, then it follows, that that philosophy which

\* The transit of Venus, which occurred in 1769.



forbids deep feeling, must at the same time remove from its possessor the power of deep thought, or at least the propensity, to indulge in it. Or if deep thought be allowed at all, it must be confined to such subjects as have no tendency to make him either a happier, or a better, man.

We also hear it said, that there is an incongruity between the imagination and the judgment, at least, that they are distinct and opposite attributes of the mind. If I do not misunderstand the reason, which is so often given for the careless perusal of fictitious writings, it is based on this sentiment. For those who resort to this source, for the avowed purpose of cultivating the imagination, are the last to peruse them in a way to improve the judgment. But does this incongruity actually exist? In answering this question, it is important to remark, that *imagination* and *fancy* are not synonymous terms; the latter representing the faculty by which the mind forms its conceptions, and the former, the power of combining and modifying these conceptions at pleasure. Milton speaks of the creations of the fancy, as

Airy shapes,  
Which reason joining or disjoining, frames  
All what we affirm or what deny, and call  
Our knowledge, or opinion; —

Nor is this the theory of the poet only. Now of what use are these “airy shapes,” till joined and arranged by the reason? Yet these are the very things, with which the minds of thousands of young females are filled, which give them only a morbid sensibility to every circumstance of excitement, whether real or imaginary, and which are the legitimate offspring of the careless perusal of novels and works of taste.

When these “airy shapes” which fancy presents to the mind, are combined and arranged into harmonious pictures by the imagination, then, and not till then, they become useful. But how can this harmonious arrangement be made, without an exercise of the judgment? If this view be correct, it follows that the imagination implies an exercise of the judgment; and that taste cannot be exercised without it. This is in accordance



with the sentiment of a recent writer on Rhetoric,\* when he defines taste as "a judgment of what is fitted to excite emotions of beauty, grandeur and sublimity, founded on the experience of past emotions."

The inference I shall draw from this view of the subject is, that the cultivation of the imagination without an exercise of the judgment involves an absurdity, and cannot take place. The imagination and judgment, instead of being at war with each other, are mutually necessary to each other's strength and perfection. A fine imagination cannot exist without a correct judgment; and in relation to the judgment, it scarcely need be said, that without imagination to aid in the combination of thought, it could be applied to no extensive object of utility. Their cultivation, then, must go hand in hand; and when one of them is neglected, they are both neglected. A luxuriant fancy, it is true, may exist without judgment; but then it exists also without imagination, and is a thousand fold worse than the possession of neither. To the poet or the painter, judgment and imagination are not less necessary than fancy itself; and are as necessary to them, as to the philosopher, the architect or the statesman. As a final inference from the whole subject, I conclude, that the imagination, like the other treasures of the mind, is the price of toil. He who would drink at Castalia's sacred fount, must first labor up the rugged steep of Parnassus.

On the general subject of dividing the mind into faculties, I would not longer dwell; but that the strange error has grown out of this, of exempting certain faculties from the necessity of study. We hear men talk of a genius for poetry, for mathematics, for painting, for extemporaneous speaking, for the languages, and in fact, for almost every thing; and all this is well enough, if the phraseology be rightly understood. If by genius is meant simply a natural aptitude or power of acquiring talents of a particular kind, we will not object to it. For we do not believe all men to possess originally the same constitution and powers of mind; nor that the most fixed application can sup-

\* Professor Newman of Bowdoin College.

ply all the native defects of the mind. But by original genius, is often meant something more than this. *Poeta nascitur non fit*, has long since passed into a proverb, with a broader signification than this exposition would give to it. And a recent writer in a foreign Review\* says—“Genius is heaven-born and fortuitous, and depends comparatively little upon culture.” This is precisely the sentiment I am about to oppose; for the circumstance, that what is here called *genius* depends *at all* on culture, proves that the writer means something more than a natural aptitude to learn.—But if it mean anything more than this, then it depends essentially and primarily on culture. Otherwise, genius is a mere imaginary thing. It may exist, any length of time, without culture, without application, without exercise. Thus he who passes for the veriest blockhead, may be the greatest genius; and all that is necessary for a display of this imaginary power, is the recurrence of some appropriate circumstance to call it into action. This notion, how gratifying to many a fond parent; while he can compliment his son, and flatter his own vanity, by saying, that “the boy has a great natural genius,” at the same time that he says, “he never could be made to apply himself to study.” Than this, no error could be more fatal to the growth of the youthful mind.

Genius, if it means anything, means the power and the disposition to study. Genius will study; it is the very nature of it to study; and where there is no love of study there is no genius. This is the ground I take;—that no natural gift can supply the place of hard study. In relation to taste and imagination, it would seem that enough had been already said. Their exercise implies an exercise of the understanding,—and such an understanding, as can be acquired only by the most careful examination of every thing to which it relates. Yet to hear some talk, we should think Homer’s an undisciplined mind. Of Shakespeare we have indeed been told by a modern Reviewer, that “after having written his thirty-eight plays, he went carelessly down to the country, and lived out his days apparently unconscious of having done anything at all extraordinary.” As

\* Foreign Quarterly Review, for July, 1834. — Art. Madame de Stael.

though some magic charm, some enchanting spell, like the gift of prophecy, rested down upon him for a time, and then left him, like the nazarite of old, weak and like another man. The immortal productions of West's pencil, we are taught to consider as the work of some fairy hand. And we have learned to look upon Henry, in the midst of his mighty efforts, with scarcely less reverence, than though the direct inspiration of Heaven had been visibly upon him.

These are strongly marked cases ; and are often quoted, as examples of the development of genius without previous discipline. And the reason that there are any cases like these, is, that study is not always *formal*, but simply a concentration of the mind upon its object, whatever it may be. It consists not alone in midnight vigils, not alone in poring over books, nor in putting on an air of thoughtfulness ; witness this same Henry. What means it, when he is seen hour after hour, apparently watching his motionless fish-line ; nor heeding the approach of footsteps, or the shades of night. To me, that gives evidence of intense study, — all absorbing, abstracted thought. His was a genius that studied every where ; and this a bliss not unlike that,

The lonely bard enjoyed, when forth he walked  
Unpurposed ; stood, and knew not why ; sat down,  
And knew not where ; arose, and knew not when ;  
Had eyes, and saw not ; ears, and nothing heard ;  
And sought — sought neither heaven nor earth — sought nought,  
Nor meant to think ; but ran meantime, through vast  
Of visionary things, fairer than ought  
That was ; and saw the distant tops of thoughts,  
Which men of common stature never saw. —  
He entered into Nature's holy place,  
And heard unutterable things ; —

things then indeed unutterable ; but afterwards uttered boldly forth, before multitudes of assembled men.

Not unlike this, must have been the history of Homer, of Shakspeare, and a thousand more. That a particular bent of mind, or aptitude for a particular study or employment often exhibits itself in early life, I do not of course deny. On the contrary, I admit that this was the case with Euler, with Newton,



with West, with Fulton, and a host of others who have become eminent in the world ; and only assert that this is all that should be embraced in the word *genius*, when used in the connection of which we are speaking. And if this be what is properly called genius, permit me to inquire, how it exhibited itself in these cases, how it could have exhibited itself, or how such a power can exhibit itself in any future case, but in a love of study, and in the power of attention to its object ? If these had been wanting, what would have remained ? — When we refer to the attainments of these men, — to any talents or skill which they possessed, these were with them, as they are in all other cases, the purchase of labor and toil. Indeed I should want no better comment than these furnish on the text, that genius is application. And could we become familiar with the history of the world's master spirits in general, and see, from infancy to the active scenes of life, the hidden workings of those gifted souls, the result would be the same. Could we see the poet's twilight abstraction and the painter's deep and unwearied study of the models of excellence in nature and in art, — could we see the orator's midnight musings, and feel his soul-thrilling interest, his overwhelming pressure of emotion, and his intense thought ; we should no longer think of genius, in connection with them, as consisting in ought but powerful feeling, strong and vivid perception, and a clear and discriminating intellect. And even though it should break forth sudden, like lightning from the cloud, we should only think, that, like the etherial fire, it had been collecting its power, long ere it flashed out before the admiring gaze of men. Excellence, then, without effort, in any department of the arts or sciences, is but a school-boy's dream ; worthy of him only who would become a learned man by reading novels and the Reviews ; or who would master the sciences, at the same time that he is indulging in all the pleasures and refinements of social life.


The last error I shall notice, attaches itself particularly to those who are commencing their education ; and this class of course embraces all who are pursuing their studies at our col-



leges and seminaries of learning. It seems to be based on the forgetfulness of the high and ennobling motives, which should ever be before the American scholar. Some of these motives are,—the love of usefulness; the opportunities offered in our country for honorable distinction; and a sense of obligation to one's friends, to his country, and to his God. In the influence of these may be found the magic of the success of our self-made men; and it is here precisely that their great strength lies. Nothing but high considerations like these, could carry them through all the various discouragements they have to meet; but with these in view, nothing has power to prevent the accomplishment of their purposes. By losing sight of these high and holy motives, how many a scholar has passed his years of improvement in indolence; relying perchance on the influence, or the wealth of his friends, to carry him through the world. How many others have sacrificed their literary rank, to the comparatively worthless pleasures of society. How many others still, like him of old, who sold his birthright for a mess of pottage, have exchanged all that is valuable in a literary reputation, for the pleasures of the cup, and the luxuries of the table. How many more, have lost sight of the permanent and rich endowments of the mind, in the glitter of present popularity, and in pursuit of the objects of a vain ambition. And oh! how many, even of those who have enriched their intellects by the highest culture, have permitted their moral natures to lie waste and desolate; and have prostituted their talents to the subversion of human happiness! Not so with him, who is looking for the reward of his toil, either to the rewards of virtue, or to that estimate which the world shall set on his talents or his labors.

In conclusion, permit me to say to the young gentlemen present;—You are at liberty to appropriate these last remarks particularly to yourselves. Look not too much at the immediate rewards of your desert. Think not too much of the present distinction which any course of conduct can purchase for you. And when tempted to turn aside from the great work in which you are engaged, to indulge in the pleasures and in the dissipating amusements of society, think of the future. There are

fields of honor in our country to be reaped ; — there are stations of usefulness to be filled. With yourselves it chiefly rests to say, whether you will become the pride of your families, go up to stations of honor and usefulness, and be remembered with gratitude by those who come after you ; or whether you will become “ the hewers of wood, and drawers of water,” to those who shall be more deserving than yourselves. In a word, remember that the *world* is your theatre, and *public life* the stage on which you are destined to act ; and that that fame, which is associated with unyielding virtue and sterling integrity, and which is bought by a generous self-devotion to the public good, is the only renown which shall cheer the decline of life, or which shall be rewarded by the love and veneration of after ages.



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